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been passed on the existing law of Kansas. In its present restricted form, the measure proposed appears a sound one; how it would succeed in a wider sphere might be an extremely dubious problem, and one which might require for its solution a long experience of the respective merits and disadvantages of each method of securing evidence.

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INTERSTATE EXTRADITION. — An interesting point, arising under the clause in the Constitution of the United States providing for the surrender of fugitives from justice, is discussed by the Attorney-General in an opinion printed on p. 41. A requisition from the Governor of Nebraska was sufficient in form according to the U. S. Rev. Stats. § 5278, and not sufficient according to Ch. 218, § 1, of the Massachusetts Public Statutes. The Attorney-General was of opinion that the latter statute was void so far as it conflicted with the U. S. statute.

The Attorney-General's opinions, being written for a layman, do not cite authorities. An examination of the cases, however, seems to show that *Kentucky v. Denison*, 24 How. 66, decides that the United States statute and the provision of the United States Constitution create only a "moral duty." Taney, C. J., there said explicitly that "the Act does not provide any means to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for neglect or refusal on the part of the executive of the State; nor is there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the government of the United States with this power." The provision in the Constitution is there held to be addressed solely to the executive of the State, and it is expressly said that "The Federal Government under the Constitution has no power . . . to compel him to perform it" (p. 107).

If the constitutional provision be not enforceable against the State, as is declared in *Kentucky v. Denison* to be the case, it would seem logically to follow that for lack of binding force it cannot make void the Act of the State Legislature; for otherwise it will be left in this singular position: it will have no Federal sanction, and yet within the State it will, as part of the Federal Constitution, operate to prevent that control of the State officials from within which is also impossible from without. It would seem, therefore, that the opinion of the Attorney-General is not in accord with the authority of the U. S. Supreme Court. Against it may also be cited the declaration that the same statute is constitutional, made by a previous Attorney-General of Massachusetts in giving his opinion in the celebrated *Kimpton Case*, in 1878, 2 Moore on Extradition, 995. The *Kimpton Case* may be distinguished, and is believed to have been recently followed, but it is submitted that any distinction from this opinion is really without a difference.

It would seem that the circumstances of the case at once show it to be desirable that the status of the Massachusetts statute should be permanently fixed, and that the opinions of Attorney-Generals are not adequate as a means to that end. It would also seem that the case was one where the Judges of the Supreme Court might have been appropriately called in to fill their constitutional function of advisers to the Governor and Council. Surely, when a statute which has long stood upon the statute-book is to be declared unconstitutional, an "important question of law" and a "solemn occasion" is presented. (Mass. Const., Ch. III., Art. II.) Then *Kentucky v. Denison*, an extreme States-Rights decision, might be denied or distinguished away. Any distinction from the *Kimpton Case*

without a difference would probably be done away with, and the final result would be more satisfactory than the present practice, not the less grateful if this opinion stood and the *Kimpton Case* was overthrown.

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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SUGAR BOUNTY. — The opinion declaring the sugar bounty unconstitutional, news of which has been widely circulated in the general press, was delivered by Shepard, J., in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in *United States ex rel. the Miles Planting Co. v. Carlisle*, 23 Washington Law Reporter, 33, — Morris, J., concurring. Alvey, C. J., declined to express an opinion on the constitutional point. It is apparent on the most cursory examination that the opinion on the constitutional point is entirely *obiter*, for the law had been repealed, and the real case of counsel for the plaintiff was founded only on a general clause excepting vested rights. That clause the court of course held not to apply to an expectancy of a bounty or gratuity. Then the court go on to declare that the bounty to be constitutional must be for a federal public purpose, and to declare that the promotion of the sugar interest is not sufficient. The cases cited are familiar ones: *Loan Association v. Topeka*, 20 Wall. 655, and its well-known phrase, that a tax to pay a bounty "is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law, and is called taxation," *Lowell v. Boston*, 111 Mass. 489, and *Cole v. Lagrange*, 113 U. S. 1. The other ground of the decision seems so clearly good that one wonders why the court launch a *brutum fulmen* against a repealed act, instead of letting the dead past bury its dead. The profession are indebted to Mr. Justice Shepard for a careful and scholarly consideration of the limits of taxation; but the profession must also recognize that it is a discussion *obiter*, and in no sense a decision.

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POTTER v. THE UNITED STATES. — Mr. Asa P. Potter is to have a new trial, and lawyers will acknowledge that no other result was desirable on the case, as it came up in the Supreme Court (15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144). Section 5208, Rev. Stat., passed in 1869, provided that no national-bank officer should certify a check unless the drawer had on deposit at the time an amount of money equal to the amount specified in the check. No penalty was imposed for a violation of this section, but in 1882 (22 Stat. 166) it was enacted that whoever should "wilfully violate" the statute of 1869 should be guilty of a misdemeanor, and should, etc. The court held that the word "wilfully" meant more than voluntarily, and that one could not wilfully violate a law if he supposed he was not violating it at all. Accordingly it is held to have been error to reject evidence of a *bona fide* agreement, by the bank officers, that a certain depositor's deficit should be treated as a loan, and that checks should be certified for him on condition that he deposited from day to day sums sufficient to cover the checks. Such an agreement, if the defendant honestly believed it lawful, would tend to negative a wilful violation of the law, although not conclusive of innocence. It was on this point that the actual decision was made, the court holding in effect that the statute required a specific intent on the defendant's part.

The indictment was held good. It alleged that the defendant wilfully certified a check by writing across the face thereof certain words. There was no allegation of delivery. Mr. Justice Brewer took it for granted